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Climate change has in the last 12 months reached 
the headlines after a gestation period of decades. It 
is high on the policy list for governments and now 
even the most sceptical politicians have accepted 
its reality, if not the urgency of measures to reduce 
its magnitude and adapt to what is unavoidable. This 
article will attempt to summarise recent findings 
and points to the need for urgent risk minimisation. 
In early 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), the world's leading 
scientific body on climate change, released the 
Summary for Policymakers of each of three Working 
Group reports. These reports form part of the IPCC's 
Fourth Assessment. 
In brief, the reports state with high confidence that 
climate change is happening and the warming of 
the world over the last several decades, is largely 
due to human emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Climate change is already having 
noticeable effects, which are likely to increase to 
potentially dangerous dimensions by or earlier than 
2100, unless greenhouse gas emissions are greatly 
reduced. Moreover, the IPCC says that impacts are 
very likely to cause costs that will increase as global 
warming increases, but that there is substantial 
potential for reductions in emissions at little cost to 
the economy, with many examples given. It reports 
that global costs of emission reductions to achieve 
stabilisation of GHG concentrations at levels 
between 445 and 710 ppm C02 equivalent would 
range between a 5% loss and a 1% gain in global 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2050. This is less 
than a tenth of one percent of the growth in GDP by 
2050. 
In agreement with the Stern Report issued in the 
UK during 2006, the IPCC Working Group HI report 
confirms that potential costs of the impacts of 
unabated climate change and sea level rise would 
far exceed the costs of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions to avoid the impacts. 
BACKGROUND 
Scientists chosen to write IPCC reports are 
appointed on the basis of their relevant expertise. 
Exhaustive processes of peer and government 
review are followed, with responses to all comments 
documented and archived for transparency. More 
than 2000 scientists from many countries are directly 
involved. The final documents are the responsibility 
of the scientist authors, but the Summaries for 
Policymakers are subject to agreement line-by-line 
by government representatives, including countries 
as disparate in their views and interests as the UK, 
Germany, Russia, the United States, China, India 
and Australia. As mis final "plenary review" is based 
on consensus and the agreement of the scientist 
authors, no single extremist position is possible. 
This does not mean that political influence is entirely 
absent: compromises are reached on some issues, 
but these have to be agreed to by the scientist 
authors. 
Changes are invariably matters of emphasis or 
expression rather than of facts. IPCC is charged with 
preparing reports that are relevant to policy but do 
not tell governments or people what to do. Three 
factors have tended to create difficulties in providing 
the best advice: 
• A tendency for many scientists involved in these 
Assessments to concentrate on "best estimates" in 
which they have most confidence, rather than on 
less certain possibilities that may be more serious 
in their impacts. The latter are important in risk 
management, since they identify and hopefully 
quantify more extreme possible outcomes that 
should be avoided by policy actions. 
• A tendency for many scientists to only state 
numerical conclusions that come from processes 
explicitly included in numerical models of climate 
and sealevel rise. Other processes may be known 
to be occurring, with possibly large impacts, but if 
these are not already in the numerical models the 
magnitude and likelihood of their impacts cannot 
be confidently stated. How these unqualified 
possibilities are dealt with in reports can be critical. 
• The cut-off date for publications considered in any 
report is set so that any statements based on recent 
work have been reviewed by relevant experts apart 
from those drafting the Assessments. Thus some 
details of the reports become out of date before they 
appear in print. 
The IPCC Assessments are very different to the day-
to-day work of a "normal" scientist. In her/his day-
to-day work, a scientist is looking for cutting edge 
results and theories. In IPCC Assessments the same 
scientist is looking for what is generally agreed 
across the field and is well supported by multiple 
lines of evidence and by multiple publications in 
the scientific, peer-reviewed literature. IPCC aims 
to identify the "gold standard" science, rather than 
the "leading edge" science. Conclusions from the 
IPCC reports have to be considered in the light of 
these factors. 
KEY FINDINGS OF THE IPCC REPORTS 
Working Group I : The Physical Science Basis (IPCC, 2007a) 
• Concentrations of GHGs now far exceed pre-
industrial values and the increases are due primarily 
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to fossil fuel usage and land-use change and 
agriculture. 
• There is now very high confidence that the global 
average effect of human activities since 1750 has 
been one of warming of about 0.8°C. Global 
warming is unequivocal, and is now evident in air 
and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of 
snow and ice, and rising global sea levels due to 
thermal expansion and ice melt. 
• Numerous long-term changes in regional climate 
have been observed including higher temperatures 
and reduced sea ice in the Arctic, changes in 
precipitation, ocean salinity, wind patterns and 
weather extremes including drought, heavy rains, 
heat waves and intensity of tropical cyclones. 
• For a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide, 
stabilised warming is likely to be in the range 2 to 
4.5°C. It is very unlikely to be less than 1.5°C but 
warmings substantially higher than 4.5°C cannot be 
excluded. 
• For the next 20 years warming of about another 
0.4°C is inevitable for the IPCC range of emissions, 
due to past emissions and lags in the climate system. 
Continued greenhouse gas emissions at or above 
current rates would cause further warming during 
the 21st century. For the full range of the IPCC 
emissions scenarios, the lowest plausible warming 
by 2100 is about 1.1°C relative to the 1990s and the 
highest is about 6.4°C. 
• Projected sea level rises by 2100 are estimated to 
be in the range 18 to 59 cm, mainly due to thermal 
expansion of the oceans and a contribution from 
melting mountain glaciers. These estimates do not 
include uncertainties in climatecarbon cycle 
feedbacks, nor the full effects of changes in ice 
dynamics, because these are not yet included in the 
models. If ice flow rates continue to increase in 
Greenland and Antarctica significantly higher sea 
level rise might occur, which IPCC estimates could 
be up to an additional 20 cm by 2100. 125,000 years 
ago, when polar regions were warmer than now, sea 
level was 4 to 6 metres higher. 
• Increased atmospheric carbon dioxide 
concentrations have led to increased acidity in the 
oceans. Further acidification is likely to occur over 
the 21st century, sufficient to inhibit coral growth 
and shell-formation in many oceanic species. 
• There is now higher confidence in projected 
patterns of warming, changes in wind patterns, 
precipitation, some aspects of extreme events and 
ice. Even if greenhouse gas concentrations are 
stabilised, warming and sea level rise would 
continue for centuries, due to the long timescales 
of climate processes and feedbacks, 
• In Australia, tropical cyclones are likely to be more 
intense, heat waves and heavy precipitation events 
more frequent, and extra-tropical storm tracks and 
wind and precipitation patterns will move further 
poleward. 
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Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability (IPCC, 2007b) 
• Observations from all continents and most oceans 
show natural systems are being affected by regional 
climate changes, especially warming. This includes 
snow, ice and permafrost, land and ocean species 
and ecosystems and ocean acidity. 67 of 75 studies 
involving 29,000 data series of physical and 
biological systems and species, show changes 
consistent with a response to warming. Effects of 
regional climate changes on human and managed 
systems are emerging, but are complicated by 
adaptation and nonclimatic stresses (e.g. land-use 
change, population growth). 
• Future impacts can now be projected for many 
sectors, e.g. increased runoff at high latitudes, 
decreased runoff and drought in some mid-latitudes, 
loss of seasonal water storage in snow and glaciers, 
loss of species and ecosystems, reduced crop 
productivity at low latitudes and at mid-latitudes 
with larger warmings, increased coastal erosion and 
flooding, displacement of many coastal populations, 
increased vulnerability of many settlements and 
industries, and increased threats to health especially 
in poor countries. 
• Specific information is available for many regions. 
Impacts on Australia will include: water problems 
in southern and eastern Australia, and significant 
losses of biodiversity in the Great Barrier Reef, the 
Queensland Wet Tropics, Kakadu, south-western 
Australia, alpine areas and the sub-Antarctic islands. 
Coastal development and population growth in 
many coastal areas will amplify losses from sea-
level rise and increased severity of storms and 
coastal flooding. Productivity from agriculture and 
forestry is expected to decline by 2030 over much 
of southern and eastern Australia due to increased 
drought and fire. While substantial adaptive capacity 
is available, there will be increasing costs associated 
with adaptation and from failure to fully adapt. 
• Regions other than Australia will also experience 
significant problems, with increasing malnutrition 
in Africa, displacement of many coastal people from 
large deltas and small islands in many countries, 
low adaptive capacity in many poor countries and 
increasing financial expense and losses even in rich 
countries, especially from impacts of extreme 
events. 
• Key impacts are expected to increase with 
increasing global warming, becoming very 
widespread and serious at warmings of only 2 or 
3°C above temperatures of the 1990s. This is 
especially true of impacts from extreme events. 
Climate change impacts are very likely to impose 
net annual costs that will increase over time as 
global warming increases. 
• Some large-scale climate events have the potential 
to cause very large global impacts, especially 
beyond 2100. Sea level rise of up to 7 m from 
melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet, and 5 m from 
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melting of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet is possible 
over timescales of centuries to millennia, possibly 
triggered by warming in the 21st century. Slowing 
of the rate of sinking of cold saline water in the 
North Atlantic is very likely during the 21st century, 
with widespread impacts on marine ecosystems, 
fisheries, ocean uptake of carbon dioxide, oceanic 
oxygen concentrations and terrestrial vegetation. 
• Adaptation is necessary to address impacts 
resulting from the warming that is already 
unavoidable due to past (and continuing) emissions. 
A wide array of adaptation options is available, but 
more is required. There are barriers, limits and costs 
to adaptation, but these are not fully understood. 
• Other stresses such as pollution, poverty and 
inappropriate development (e.g. rapid population 
growth) increase vulnerability to climate change. 
Sustainable development can reduce vulnerability 
to climate change, while climate change can impede 
sustainable development. 
• Many impacts can be avoided, reduced or delayed 
by reducing GHG emissions. 
Working Group III : Mitigation of Climate 
Change (Reducing Emissions and Mitigating 
Impacts) (IPCC, 2007c) 
• Global GHG emissions per annum (weighted by 
their respective global warming potentials) have 
increased by 70% between 1970 and 2004 and will 
continue to grow under current policies. 
• There is substantial economic potential for limiting 
or reducing GHG emissions over the coming 
decades, even below current levels. Key 
technologies for reducing emission of GHGs are 
available in all relevant sectors including energy 
supply, transport, buildings, industry, agriculture, 
forestry and waste, and also through non-
technological means such as life style changes and 
management practices. 
• These technologies will often have other benefits. 
For example, improvements in energy facilities can 
create opportunities to reduce GHG emissions, and 
at the same time reduce air pollution, improve the 
balance of trade, and provide better services in rural 
areas and increased employment. 
• Geo-engineering options such as ocean fertilisation 
to remove atmospheric C02, or blocking sunlight 
in the upper atmosphere remain largely speculative 
and unproven, with unknown side effects and costs. 
• In order to stabilise GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere and thus eventually the climate, 
emissions must peak and then decline. The lower 
the needed stabilisation level, the sooner the peak 
and decline must occur. Emissions reductions over 
the next two or three decades will have a large 
impact on opportunities to reach lower levels. 
• Stabilisation of atmospheric GHG concentrations 
in the low range of 445-490 ppm C02 equivalent 
would still lead to eventual global wanning in the 
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range of about 1° to 3°C (which entails a risk of 
causing "widespread and serious" climate change). 
(This is actually a WGI result, but does not appear 
in the WGI SPM Summary despite its critical 
importance for policy. It is in the WGIII) 
Figure SPM 8. What is "dangerous" is a subjective 
judgement.2 To reach the lower stabilisation levels 
some scenarios depend upon removal of C02 from 
the atmosphere (negative emissions). 
• The range of stabilisation levels assessed by IPCC 
can be achieved with a portfolio of technologies, 
assuming appropriate incentives are in place for 
their development and deployment. Global costs of 
emission reductions to achieve stabilisation of GHG 
concentrations at levels between 445 and 710 ppm 
C02 equivalent would range between a 5% loss and 
a 1% gain in GDP in 2050. This is less than a tenth 
of one percent of the growth in GDP by 2050. 
• Choosing an appropriate level of global emissions 
reductions over time is a risk management process. 
It involves balancing the costs of more rapid 
emission reductions now against the longer-term 
risks from climate change. 
• Many national policies and instruments are 
available to governments to create the incentives 
for reducing emissions. Each of these has 
advantages and disadvantages. All approaches (such 
as regulations and standards, taxes and charges, 
tradeable permits and other incentives) can be 
designed well or poorly, and be stringent or lax. 
• Policies that provide a price on carbon emissions 
could create incentives for producers and consumers 
to invest in low-GHG products, technologies and 
processes. However, many barriers to 
implementation of emission reduction policies exist. 
• Government support through financial 
contributions, tax credits, standard setting and 
market creation is important for effective technology 
development, innovation and deployment, and for 
transfer to developing countries. 
• The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol stimulated 
an array of national policies, created an international 
carbon market and established new mechanisms that 
may provide the foundation of future emissions 
reduction efforts. There are many options for 
reducing GHG emissions globally through 
international cooperation. 
• Changing the pattern of development to make it 
more sustainable can make a major contribution to 
emissions reductions but extra resources may be 
needed to overcome barriers. Observations suggest 
changes are happening faster than the IPCC mid-
range 
As noted above, there are several key reasons why 
the IPCC reports tend to be conservative: the 
tendency for scientists to cite the middle of the range 
of uncertainty, when risk management requires that 
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we consider the risk of changes near the top of the 
range; a hesitance to cite results that are not 
quantified and thus already in numerical models; 
and the early cut-off date for publications considered 
in IPCC reports in order that they can be fully 
reviewed by peer reviewers. In the case of the 2007 
IPCC reports, this means that only papers published 
up to about mid-2006 were considered. However, 
several important papers have appeared since then. 
Rahmstorf (2007) made an estimate of the sea-level 
rise by 2100 based on correlations between observed 
global warming relative to pre-industrial for each 
decade since 1881 and observed sealevel rise for 
the same decades. Using this relationship and the 
IPCC range of emission scenarios for global 
warming he estimates the range of sea-level rise as 
50 to 140 cm by 2100, which is much larger than 
the IPCC estimates. Rahmstorf assumed a linear 
relationship between warming and sea-level rise. 
However, if we assume the relationship accelerates 
due to various amplifying effects, notably 
acceleration of outlet glaciers from Greenland and 
Antarctica, then sea-level rise by 2100 could be 
several meters (Hansen, 2005, 2007; Hansen et al., 
2007). Indeed Hansen (2007) argues that scientists 
have been too inhibited m communicating the threat 
of a potentially large rise in sea level. Bamber et al. 
(2007), state that there is growing evidence that 
mass loss [from Greenland and the West Antarctic 
Ice Sheet] has increased in the last decade and it 
seems likely that this trend will be maintained if 
the amplified warming in the polar regions 
continues". They note that present ice-flow models 
cannot explain the observations, and go on to say 
that "we are able to confidently state that modern-
day ice sheets can respond rapidly to external 
forcing, but if asked "Will ice sheets in the near 
future respond rapidly...?" we must give a qualified 
'maybe'." 
More importantly perhaps, Rahsmtorf et al. (2007) 
reported that carbon dioxide concentrations, global 
average temperatures and sea-level rise are all 
tracking since 1990 near the top of the range of 
estimates from the IPCC range of emission 
scenarios. This is shown in Figure 1. 
There are a number of causes. Firstly, C02 
emissions are in fact increasing more rapidly than 
was expected in most of the IPCC scenarios, due to 
rapid economic growth rates in many countries, 
especially major developing countries such as China 
and India. 
Indeed, Raupach et al. (2007) report that C02 
emissions from fossil-fuel burning and industrial 
processes have been accelerating globally, with their 
growth rate increasing from 1 % per annum for 1990-
1999 to >3% per annum for 2000-2004. This is 
faster than the most fossil-fuel intensive of the IPCC 
scenarios, and was driven by a cessation or reversal 
of the earlier decline in the energy intensity of gross 
domestic product (energy per unit GDP) and the 
carbon intensity of energy (emissions per unit 
energy). This is compounded by the continuing 
increases in population and per-capita GDP. The 
growth rate in emissions is greatest in developing 
Clean Air Journal, Vol 16, No. 2, December 2007 
economies such as China, although emissions are 
still increasing in most developed countries, which 
have emitted the bulk of emissions since the 
industrial revolution. 
These developments pose serious issues regarding 
global equity in any real attempt to reduce global 
emissions. Another reason for the more rapid 
warming is that the cooling effect of atmospheric 
particulates, sometimes referred to as "global 
dimming", was larger than assumed. It is now 
decreasing as sources of particulate pollution are 
brought under control especially in North America 
and Europe (see Pittock, 2006, 2007). 
The rapid rate of climate change is exacerbated by 
a number of positive feedback or amplifying effects 
that have been observed to be happening in recent 
decades (full references in Pittock, 2006 and 2007). 
Several of these are not yet fully accounted for on 
the climate models. These effects include: 
• Arctic permafrost (frozen ground) and snow cover 
are decreasing, leading to more absorption of 
incoming sunlight (e.g. Overland, 2006). 
• The living biosphere, particularly forests and soils, 
are turning increasingly from being absorbers of 
atmospheric C02 to being emitters of C02 due to 
warming, drought stress of plants and increasing 
forest and peat fires (e.g. Canadell et al. 2007). 
• Artic sea ice is retreating rapidly, leading to more 
absorption of sunlight and greater regional warming. 
A very recent paper by Stroeve et al. (2007) states 
that "none or very few individual model simulations 
show trends comparable to observations". 
• Changes in air and sea circulations in middle and 
high latitudes are accelerating changes in higher 
latitudes. Mid-latitude westerly winds in both 
hemispheres have moved polewards and surface 
ocean gyres have accelerated affecting the East 
Australian Current, with more heat transport 
polewards, possibly adding to destabilisation of the 
West Antarctic Ice Sheet (e.g. Cai et al., 2005; Fyfe 
and Saenko, 2006). 
• Rapid changes in Greenland and Antarctica, 
including increased surface melting in summer and 
undercutting and disintegration of floating ice 
shelves and tidewater (i.e. floating) glaciers that 
retard ice outflow. These processes are not included 
so far in glaciological models (Bamber et al. 2007). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, 
summaries of which have been released, confirm 
that global warming is happening and is primarily 
due to human release of stored carbon from fossil 
fuels, forests and soils. The science indicates that 
widespread effects are to be expected, and there is 
growing evidence from observations that this is 
happening. 
Latest IPCC projections indicate a likelihood of 
greater global warmings by 2100 than previously 
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projected. However, IPCC projections of sea level 
rise are conservative because they have not 
quantified the effects of accelerated ice dynamics 
in Greenland and Antarctica. More recent estimates, 
based on observations, suggest that sea level rise 
will be in the range of 50 to 140 cm by 2100, but 
even this may be an under-estimate if outlet glaciers 
continue to accelerate. 
There are a number of processes not yet adequately 
included in climate and glaciological models, 
although they have been observed. These 
inadequately modeled processes are expected to 
increase the risk of damaging climate change and 
sea level rise. IPCC (2007c) calculations broadly 
confirm the Stern Review (2006) estimates that the 
damages from potential climate change are likely 
to be much greater than the cost of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. They also suggest that 
to avoid a 2-3°C global warming above pre-
industrial values, greenhouse gas concentrations 
may need to be kept below 450 ppm C02 equivalent 
(see Figure SPM-8 in the IPCC report). According 
to IPCC, such a target may require reducing 
emissions to zero or below, with any delay making 
the task even more difficult. 
These results have been approved, in summary form, 
by member country governments of the IPCC 
(including Australia). Thus they can no longer be 
dismissed as the work of rabid environmentalists, 
doom-mongers or alarmists. The problem now is 
not with the science (even though that needs 
improvement) but with policy-makers. Policy must 
be about risk management, that is, about how to 
avoid the unacceptable, not about what is most likely 
to happen. The real question is no longer whether 
climate change is happening, but how to adapt to 
what is now unavoidable, and how to rapidly reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions so as to avoid what we 
may not be able to adapt to. A key policy question 
that follows is how to encourage and enable 
developing countries to limit their emissions while 
still enabling them to have rising living standards. 
These are not easy questions, but hopefully they are 
not beyond human ingenuity to answer. 
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